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ARGUMENT 
The arguments in this Reply Brief presented by Appellant Brookside Mobile 
Home Park, Ltd. ("Brookside") are limited to the new matters raised by Defendants 
Samuel B. Peebles ("Sam Peebles") and Han xjether the "Peebles") 
in their 
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF BROOKSIDE SHOULD BE 
REINSTATED. 
A. The Bona Fide Purchaser Rule is not Moot in the Sum / 
Judgment Phase of this Matter. 
Contrary to the arguments \ >t the Peebles, the bona fide purchaser rule is not 
n mi > I if i Hit summary judgment phase of this matter. (Brief of Appellees at pages 
19-20.) Though the Court of Appeals addressed the bona fide purchaser rule 
regarding only Sam Peebles during the trial phase H 
Appeals incorrectly detennim-il l lul IIit• Mnluh Home Park Residency Act has 
iiwrtlirtated trip common law bona fide purchaser rule. Brookside Mobile Home 
Park. Ltd. v. Peebles, et al.. 2000 UT App 314 at ^29,14 P.3d 105. Should this 
Court concur with the arguments of Brookside sel loriii m Secli< iai 
Brief before thih Cuiiil llu ',IHInn^iv judgment against both the Peebles should be 
reinstated. 
1. Brookside did not Assume any Lease Sam Peebles may Have 
had With the Previous Owner of the Park. 
In their brief the Peebles ,-IUJIH' lli.it Brookside assumed all leases and 
•agreements appurtenant to the Brookside Mobile Home Park (the "Park") when it 
purchased the Park pursuant to the terms of the Assignment. (Brief of Appellees 
at page 22, n. 6.) The Peebles thus argue that Brookside therefore assumed the 
Sam Peebles lease though it is not listed on the rent roll attachment to the 
Assignment. (Brief of Appellees at page 26.) In making this argument, the Peebles 
have intentionally mischaracterized the language of the Assignment by quoting only 
a portion of it out of context. The Peebles continue to make this misleading 
argument as they did before the trial court and the Court of Appeals although a brief 
review of the actual language of the Assignment reveals that the argument has no 
basis whatsoever in fact. The relevant language of the Assignment states that 
Brookside was assigned: 
right, title, and interest in and to those certain leases, rental 
agreements, security or other deposits from tenants, and rentals with 
respect to such leases and agreements appurtenant to the Property, 
except as provided herein (hereinafter collectively referred to as the 
'Leases'), which Leases, rents, and security deposits are more 
particularly described on Exhibit 'B' attached hereto and incorporated 
herein by this reference. 
(R. 293.) Contrary to the claims of the Peebles in their Brief, the Assignment limits 
those rental agreements being assumed by Brookside to those "particularly 
described" on Exhibit "B" which included the Rowley lease for space #100. (R.298.) 
2. How the Bona Fide Purchaser Rule Applies to the Mobile Home 
Park Residency Act is a Case of First Impression. 
Whether the Mobile Home Park Residency Act invalidates the bona fide 
purchaser rule is a case of first impression for this Court. The Mobile Home Park 
Residency Act is not a uniform act and its language is unique to Utah. Counsel for 
Brookside has been unable to locate any other jurisdiction that has dealt with the 
interaction between their mobile home park statutes and the bona fide purchaser 
rule. However, this Court need not determine the relationship between the bona 
fide purchaser rule and the Act, if the Defendants Peebles are not entitled to the 
benefit of the Act. 
3. The Peebles are not "Residents" as Defined by the Mobile 
Home Park Residency Act. 
As argued in Section III of Brookside's initial brief before this Court and 
Section 111.A of this brief, the Peebles are not "residents" under the Mobile Home 
Park Residency Act and should therefor not be entitled to the benefits granted 
residents under the Act. 
The Peebles argue that whether or not Brookside preserved the bona fide 
purchaser rule during the summary judgment phase is moot because the Court of 
Appeals determined the rule irrelevant in light of the Mobile Home Park Residency 
Act regarding the trial phase of this matter. (Brief of Appellees at pages 19-20.) 
However, the bona fide purchaser rule is not moot because even under the Court 
of Appeals' analysis, Harold Peebles was never a "resident" as defined by the 
Mobile Home Park Residency Act and so would be subject to the bona fide 
purchaser rule even if Sam Peebles as a resident would not. Even applying the 
Court of Appeals' analysis, the summary judgment against Harold Peebles is valid. 
The summary judgment previously granted Brookside in this matter was 
against both Sam Peebles and Harold Peebles. The Court of Appeals ruled that 
it was "irrelevant" that the jury held that Brookside had not assumed Sam Peebles' 
lease because the Mobile Home Park Residency Act "provides no way for a buyer 
of a mobile home park to deem terminated any lease it does not specifically 
assume."1 Brookside at p 9 . It is undisputed that Harold Peebles never entered 
into a lease with anyone regarding space #100 of the Park. There is therefore no 
"un-terminated" lease that would give Harold Peebles resident status under the 
Mobile Home Park Residency Act Harold Peebles was a pant owner of a mobile 
home that occupied space #100 of the Park (R. 699 and 715). Harold Peebles 
would therefore be correctly pursued under Utah's unlawful detainer statute. It may 
be for this reason that the Court of Appeals declined to address Harold Peebles 
liability in this matter rather than a failure of Brookside to comply with Rule 24(a)(9) 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure as it claimed. Brookside at |^1 n.1. 
(Brookside's arguments regarding the reinstatement of Harold Peebles as a 
defendant are located in Section VI of Brookside's initial Brief before this Court.) 
Following the logic of the Court of Appeals, Brookside would have had to 
pursue Sam Peebles's eviction under the Mobile Home Park Residency Act and 
Harold Peebles's eviction under Utah's unlawful detainer statute though they are 
both owners of the same mobile home, neither entered into a lease with Brookside, 
no lease with any owner of the Park was ever introduced at trial for Sam Peebles 
This conclusion also ignores substantial evidence that, through their conduct, 
Sam Peebles and the predecessor owner mutually terminated their lease 
agreement. See Section II below. 
A 
or Harold Peebles, and Sam Peebles specifically refused to enter into a lease with 
Brookside. (R. 484; T. 184.) 
4. Brookside did not Have Constructive Notice That the Peebles 
Claimed a Lessee Interest in Space #100. 
In their brief, the Peebles argue that due to their mobile home being located 
on space #100 at the time of Brookside's purchase of the Park, Brookside had 
constructive notice of Sam Peebles' interest in space #100. (Brief of Appellees at 
page 21.) However, on the rent roll attached to the Purchase Agreement, Richard 
Rowley was noted as the tenant of space #100. (R. 298.) Given that Rowley was 
leasing space #100 and personally residing there, Brookside did not have notice 
that the Peebles claimed an interest in space #100. (R. 302.) 
The Peebles also cite Latses v. Nick Floor. Inc.. 99 Utah 214,104 P.2d 619 
(Utah 1940) for the proposition that a grantee's position is no stronger than the 
grantor's. In Latses. the tenants occupied the premises openly and the buyer had 
failed to meet its burden to investigate the tenants occupying the subject premises 
and the terms of such contractual relations. ]g\ at 622. This duty to a prospective 
purchaser to investigate claimed interests in premises when openly occupied is 
more fully explained by this Court in Meagher v. Dean etal.. 97 Utah 173, 91 P.2d 
454 (1939), which Latses cites as controlling. Latses at 622. 
If the possession was of the character required by law, and had 
sufficient notoriety, certainty, and exclusiveness, the notice was a legal 
deduction from the fact of possession; and all persons dealing with the 
title to the land were chargeable with notice of his possession, whether 
they had actual knowledge thereof, or not." Meagher at 457 (citations 
omitted). 
A more recent opinion from the Utah Court of Appeals clarifies when a buyer 
has constructive notice of a claimed interest in real properly, when a duty to 
investigate arises, and the scope of investigation required. In U.P.C.. Inc. v. R.O.A. 
General. Inc.. 1999 Utah Ct. App. 303, the Court of Appeals stated in the context 
of a buyer purchasing property subject to a lease for a billboard located on the 
property: 
Constructive notice can take two forms. First, pursuant to the 
recording statute, constructive notice is imparted when documents are 
properly recorded. Second, constructive notice arises from a duty to 
inquire when one has knowledge of certain facts and circumstances. 
This second type of notice is referred to as inquiry notice. U.P.C. at 
j[35 (citations omitted). 
In this matter, there is no dispute that the Peebles did not record with the 
County recorder a lease or notice of any interest in space #100. The issue then 
becomes whether or not Brookside was subject to inquiry notice. When Brookside 
purchased the Park, the Peebles were not in personal possession of space #100. 
Although the Peebles' mobile home occupied space #100, the actual person in 
possession of the space was Richard Rowley. Not only was Richard Rowley in 
personal and physical possession of space #100, which was never contested by 
Peebles, he also had a valid written lease with the seller of the Park. The Peebles 
therefore did not possess space #100 with "sufficient notoriety, certainty, and 
exclusiveness" to put Brookside on inquiry notice that they claimed an interest in 
space #100. Meagher at 457 (emphasis added). 
Even if Brookside was on inquiry notice with a duty to investigate, its 
investigation was sufficient. In U.P.C. the Court of Appeals deemed the buyer 
failed to meet its burden because though the buyer had an unsigned version of the 
lease in its possession, it relied on verbal misrepresentations of the terms of the 
lease from the seller without contacting the lessee regarding the lease terms. la\ 
at ffif 37, 38, and n. 4. Brookside met its duty to inquire by obtaining a rent roll 
which listed Rowley as the lessee of space #100, reviewing the terms of the actual 
lease the previous owner had with Rowley, confirming that Rowley actually 
occupied and possessed space #100, and in entering into a subsequent new lease 
directly with Rowley. (R. at 409,414-15; T. 111-12.) 
The Peebles argue that such investigation was insufficient and that Brookside 
could have obtained the vehicle identification number of the mobile home in 
question, contacted the Department of Motor Vehicles, and learned that the 
Peebles owned the same.2 (Brief of Appellees at page 22.) Presumably Brookside 
would have had to take the additional step of contacting the Peebles to determine 
if they claimed an interest in space #100. Even if Brookside could have identified 
the Peebles as the owners of the mobile home in question, requiring Brookside to 
2Before commencing this action, Brookside's counsel attempted to locate the 
VIN on the mobile home but the plates containing the numbers had been removed. 
Counsel then contact the Department of Motor Vehicles providing information of the 
location of the mobile home and requesting the identity of the owner. The 
Department of Motor Vehicles informed Brookside's counsel that Cecil Rowley 
owned the mobile home in question. Brookside initially named Cecil Rowley as a 
defendant in this matter but dismissed him when the information proved to be 
incorrect. (R. 1-7.) 
7. 
investigate beyond Rowley as the proper party in possession of the premises would 
be akin to requiring the buyer in Latses to identify and contact all the owners of 
equipment located in rental units because such equipment owners could potentially 
claim a lessee interest in such rental units. Such a burden is not reasonable and 
not required under the bona fide purchaser rule. 
B. Brookside Made a Prima Facie Case of Unlawful Detainer During 
the Summary Judgment Phase of this Action. 
In their brief, the Peebles raise the argument that Brookside failed to comply 
with the unlawful detainer statute at the summary judgment stage of this action 
without providing any detail of such failure and instead directing this Court to 
arguments regarding issues occurring at the trial stage of the proceedings. (Brief 
of Appellees at pages 23 and 31-37.) An issue the Peebles subsequently argue is 
that Brookside failed to properly comply with the notice requirements of the 
Unlawful Detainer Act. (Brief of Appellees at page 36.) The Peebles have failed 
to preserve this issue for review on appeal. 
"When there is no indication in the record on appeal that the trial court 
reached or ruled on an issue, this court will not undertake to consider the issue on 
appeal." Estate of Morrison. 933 P.2d 1015,1018 (Utah App. 1997). The Peebles 
failed to raise this issue at the summary judgment of the proceedings and therefore 
have not preserved this issue and it cannot be heard at this time. In order to 
reserve an issue on appeal, the trial court must have an "opportunity to consider" 
the arguments raised on appeal. \± 
Even if the Peebles have preserved the issue of proper service under 
unlawful detainer, the record at the summary judgment phase indicates that 
Brookside complied with the requirements of the Utah Code regarding unlawful 
detainer. Pursuant to the Unlawful Detainer Act, a tenant of real property is guilty 
of unlawful detainer "when, having leased real property for an indefinite time with 
monthly or other period rent reserved . . . [ , ] in case of tenancies at will, where he 
remains in possession of the premises after the expiration of a notice not less than 
five days." Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-3(b). If a person of suitable age or discretion 
cannot be found at the place of residence, then notice may be served "by affixing 
a copy in a conspicuous place on the leased property." Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-
6(2)(b). 
The Peebles' liability for rent to Brookside arose from the Mobile Home Park 
Residency Act which states "the lienholder of record of a mobile home is primarily 
liable to the mobile home park owner or operator for rent."3 Utah Code Ann. § 57-
16-9. Because the Peebles' liability is created by statute, such a tenancy should 
be deemed a tenancy at will, rather than a month to month tenancy, because there 
was no agreement between the parties, either verbal or written, creating the 
tenancy. After service on the Peebles of notice of their duty to pay rent as 
lienholders, the Peebles made sporadic payments and were in default at the time 
Brookside served notice of unlawful detainer and when this matter went to trial. (R. 
3By entering into various contracts to sell the mobile home, the Peebles 
became purchase money lenders securing the obligations owed them with the 
mobile home. 
415-418; T. T. 274-76.) The Peebles' sporadic payments to Brookside was in 
compliance with a statutory mandate and should not be deemed to create a 
tenancy beyond a tenancy at will. 
Brookside served the Peebles with a five-day notice by posting the same on 
the trailer pursuant to the affidavit of service executed by Constable William L. Mciff. 
(R. at 65-66.) The Peebles themselves indicate that the mobile home was vacant 
at the time of the posting. (Brief of Appellees at page 36.) Such service by posting 
was therefore proper because there would not have been "a person of suitable age 
or discretion" at the mobile home with whom to leave a copy. Utah Code Ann. § 78-
36-3. 
The Peebles argue that Brookside should have attempted to serve the 
Peebles at their places of residence4 and, if no person of suitable age or discretion 
was available, then posting at the mobile home. Given the intent of the statute and 
wording of the entire statute, it is clear that "the place of residence" to be served is 
the same location as "the leased property." Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-6(2). It should 
also be noted that Constable Mciff also indicated in his affidavit that he mailed 
copies of the notices to the Peebles at the addresses "12067 South 2240 West 
Riverton, Utah 84065, and also 12668 So, 2360 West Riverston 84065." (R. at 66.) 
At trial, the trial court did not allow the admission of the affidavit of service 
because Constable Mciff was deceased before this matter went to trial and was 
4lt is of interest that the Peebles here admit that they are not residents of the 
Park contrary to their arguments elsewhere in their brief. (Brief of Appellees at 
page 36.) 
HA 
therefore unavailable for cross examination. (T. at 138.) However, under Utah law 
a "constable's Affidavit of Service is prima facie evidence of proper service of 
process and is deemed presumptively correct." Classic Cabinets. Inc. v. All 
American Life Ins. Co.. 978 P.2d 465,468 (Utah 1999). The burden shifts to the 
party opposing the affidavit to show the "invalidity or absence of service of process 
. . . by clear and convincing evidence." Jd- (citations omitted) Because the trial 
court erroneously refused to admit into evidence the affidavit of service of process, 
the record at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings was different than 
the record at trial. The trial court's ruling at trial was incorrect pursuant to Classic 
Cabinet, and reversible by this Court. 
The issue of improper service of the notice to quit in this matter was not 
preserved for appeal by the Peebles. Even if it had been preserved, the service 
was proper under the plain language and spirit of Section 78-36-6(2) of the Utah 
Code Annotated. Furthermore, it is reversible error not to admit the affidavit of 
service in this matter. The Peebles have failed to rebut the presumption of valid 
service by clear and convincing evidence. 
C. Waiver and Estoppel do not bar Brookside's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
In their brief the Peebles argue that an independent basis to uphold the trial 
court's grant of their Motion to Reconsider is waiver and estoppel due to 
Brookside's acceptance of rental payments. (Brief of Appellees at page 24.) 
However, the Peebles failed to raise this issue during the summary judgment phase 
of this action. 
"When there is no indication in the record on appeal that the trial court 
reached or ruled on an issue, this court will not undertake to consider the issue on 
appeal." Estate of Morrison. 933 P.2d 1015,1018 (Utah App. 1997). In order to 
reserve an issue on appeal, the trial court must have an "opportunity to consider" 
the arguments raised on appeal. IdL Please also see Section III.C below for 
arguments relating to the stipulation entered into by the Peebles that Brookside's 
acceptance of payments would not prejudice its interests in this action. 
The Peebles payment of rent was as a lienholder of the mobile home who 
has a primary obligation for payment of rent to Brookside. Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-
9. On November 29, 1995, Brookside gave notice to the Peebles to vacate the 
premises as lienholder of the trailer stating: 
BE ADVISED THAT THE ABOVE-REFERENCED MOBILE HOME 
HAS BEEN ABANDONED. IN ACCORDANCE WITH UTAH CODE § 
57-16-9, YOU , A LIENHOLDER OF RECORD AND NOW DEEMED 
A TENANT AT WILL ARE PRIMARILY LIABLE TO THE BROOKSIDE 
MOBILE HOME PARK FOR ALL RENT AND SERVICE CHARGES 
ACCRUING AFTER TEN (10) DAYS FOLLOWING YOUR RECEIPT 
OF THIS NOTICE IF THE MOBILE HOME IS NOT MOVED. 
(R. at 432.) Any payment of rent by the Peebles was as a lienholder as provided 
under Section 57-16-9 of the Mobile Home Park Residency Act. 
Though the Peebles correctly contend that it is "undisputed that all rents due 
and owing Brookside while the mobile home occupied space #100 were paid by 
Peebles," with the balance being tendered at trial, the record shows that the 
•10 
Peebles paid rent only sporadically, making partial payments, and paying rent in 
arrears after it was past due. (Brief of Appellees 10 n. 4; R. 418; T. 275-77; T. 508) 
The Peebles were in default when Brookside commenced its action, filed its motion 
for summary judgment, and took this matter to trial. (R. 5; R. 418; T. 275-77) 
Furthermore, Brookside stopped negotiating checks tendered by the Peebles until 
the Parties entered into a stipulation regarding the same as noted in Section III.C 
below. 
The Peebles cite Girard v. Appleby. 660 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983) as 
support for their argument. However, though "acceptance of rental payments may 
constitute waiver of a claim of breach . . ., this is just one fact to consider in 
determining whether there was waiver." Olympus Hills Shopping Center. Ltd. v. 
Smith's Food & Drug Centers. Inc.. 889 P.2d 445, 461 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
(citations omitted). Given that the payments were tendered after the completion of 
the term to which they applied, the parties stipulated that Brookside would not be 
prejudiced by accepting payments, and the Peebles were liable for such payments 
as lienholders pursuant to Section 57-16-9 of the Mobile Home Park Residency Act, 
acceptance of such payments by Brookside does not comprise a waiver by 
Brookside. 
D. Law of the Case Doctrine does not bar Brookside's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
In their brief the Peebles argue that the trial court was barred under the 
doctrine of the law of the case from granting Brookside's Motion for Summary 
Judgment when an earlier Motion for Summary Judgment by Brookside had been 
denied. (Brief of Appellees at page 24, n. 9.) The Peebles have first brought this 
argument on appeal before the Court of Appeals. It has therefore not been 
preserved below and is barred. Estate of Morrison. 933 P.2d 1015 (Utah App. 
1997). 
Even if the Peebles preserved this issue, as noted in the case cited by the 
Peebles in their brief, "any judge is free to change his or her mind on the outcome 
of a case until a decision is formally rendered." Salt Lake City Corp. v. James 
Constructors. Inc.. 761 P.2d 42,45 (Utah App. 1988) (citations omitted). Although 
a trial court is not bound by its own precedents, "prior relevant rulings made in the 
same case are generally to be followed." JcL (citations omitted). The "law of the 
case" doctrine is most applicable regarding motions for summary judgment when 
"a subsequent motion fails to present the case in a different light, such as when no 
new, material evidence is introduced." \± (citations omitted). 
In this matter, significant discovery had occurred after Brookside's initial 
motion for summary judgment. Brookside introduced new material evidence in the 
form of deposition testimony which supported its second motion for summary 
judgment and persuaded the court to grant the same. If applicable in this matter, 
the "law of the case" doctrine would bar the Peebles' Motion for Reconsideration, 
a motion not recognized under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and involving 
repetitious contentions of the issues of this case. 
A A 
II. ANY LEASE SAM PEEBLES HAD WITH A PREVIOUS OWNER OF THE 
PARK SHOULD BE DEEMED SURRENDERED AS A MATTER OF LAW 
BOTH IN THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND TRIAL PHASES OF THIS 
MATTER. 
A. Sam Peebles Surrendered a Lease With the Previous Owner of 
the Park, Entered Into a New Lease with the Previous Owner, and 
Subsequently Surrendered the Second Lease. 
Sam Peebles surrendered a lease for space #100 of the Park with the 
previous owner and entered into a new lease with the previous owner when he 
again came into personal possession of space #100. Sam Peebles subsequently 
also surrendered the second lease for space #100. The Peebles sold the mobile 
home on numerous occasions, turning their interest in the mobile home into one of 
purchase money lenders. 
In December of 1983, the Peebles purchased the mobile home and entered 
into a lease with the former owner of the Park for space #100. (R. 479; T. 400-02.) 
In November of 1986, the Peebles sold the mobile home to Bud Jones and Barbara 
Peacock. (R. 480; T. 175.) After selling the mobile home to Bud Jones and 
Barbara Peacock, Sam Peebles moved out of the mobile home. (R. 481; T. 177.) 
Bud Jones and Barbara Peacock then entered into a lease agreement directly with 
the previous owner of the Park for the lease of Space No. 100. (R. 481; T. 178.) 
Upon selling the mobile home to Bud Jones and Barbara Peacock, the Peebles 
became lenders and Bud Jones and Barbara Peacock became the residents. (R. 
481.) After about six months, Bud Jones and Barbara Peacock thereafter defaulted 
on their purchase contract and the Peebles retook possession of the mobile home. 
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(R. 481; T. 179-80.) Upon taking possession of the mobile home, Sam Peebles 
entered into a new lease with the previous owner of the Park. (R. 481; T. 179-80.) 
The Peebles then sold the mobile home to Leroy Carlson and Tina Shayla. 
(R. 481.) Carlson and Shayla took personal possession of space #100 and entered 
into a lease for the same with the previous owner of the Park. (R. 481-82.) 
Subsequent to Carlson and Shayla defaulting on their purchase of the mobile 
home, Kathy Burgess was also in the process of purchasing the mobile home from 
the Peebles while she rented it. (R. 482; R. 492; R. 495; T. 327.) 
At the time Brookside purchased the Park, the Peebles were selling the 
mobile home to Richard Rowley. In their brief the Peebles falsely claim that 
Brookside misrepresented the record with the statement that the Peebles were 
selling their mobile home to Richard Rowley.5 (Brief of Appellees page 6 n. 2.) 
As documented by these series of events, the Peebles had sold the mobile 
home to numerous parties and by doing so became purchase money lenders 
5At trial Sam Peebles testified he was selling Rowley the mobile home as 
follows: 
Q. Did Mr. Rowley — did you have an arrangement with Mr. Rowley 
where he was supposed to buy the home ? 
A. Yes, it was actually — it was supposed to be like a lease to own with 
option, and he never followed through. 
Q. But you did have an arrangement ? 
A. He just rented it. 
Q. Well, you said it was also leased to own or supposed to buy; isn't that 
correct? 
A. Supposed to buy, but he never optioned or anything. 
Q. Well, he never paid you for the price, did he? 
A. No. 
(T. 183-84.) 
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regarding the mobile home. Sam Peebles had acknowledged his surrender of an 
earlier lease with the previous owner of the park by entering into a new lease with 
that owner after retaking possession of space #100. Sam Peebles subsequently 
surrendered the second lease on space #100 when he sold the mobile home to 
three different parties (Carlson and Shayla, Kathy Burgess, and Richard Rowley) 
and these purchasers each entered into leases with the previous owner of the Park. 
As argued in Section II of Brookside's initial brief before this Court, it is impossible 
for the previous owner of the Park to convey a real property interest which is 
incompatible with a pre-existing interest. The creation of the subsequent leasehold 
interests with the assent of Sam Peebles necessarily terminates the landlord/tenant 
relationship between the previous owner of the Park and Sam Peebles. 
B. Parol Evidence Rule Bars Evidence of Practices Contrary to the 
Unambiguous Language of the Lease. 
The parol evidence rule bars admission of evidence of practices of the 
previous owner contrary to the unambiguous language of leases used by the park 
owner. It is well established under Utah law that parol evidence rule "operates, in 
the absence of fraud or other invalidating causes, to exclude evidence of 
contemporaneous conversations, representations, or statements offered for the 
purpose of varying or adding to the terms of an integrated contract." Hall v. Process 
Instruments and Control. Inc.. 890 P.2d 1024,1026 (Utah 1995) (citations omitted). 
However, parol evidence can be "admissible to clarify ambiguous terms" of an 
agreement. Id, at 1027. Such evidence may only clarify ambiguous language and 
"not contradict any ambiguous terms in the agreement." Glauser Storage. LLC. 
v. Smedley. 2001 UT App. 141 at 1J21 n. 2,27 P.3d 565. 
Though the Peebles never entered into evidence any lease that Sam 
Peebles' had with a former owner of the Park, there is undisputed evidence that 
such leases forbid subleasing of spaces in the Park. (T. 86-87.) The parol 
evidence rule bars admission of any evidence that the previous owner's practices 
were to sublease or lease the same spaces to more than one person. As argued 
in the following Section II.C, no evidence was produced at trial of such practices. 
Even if there was such evidence it would be barred by the parol evidence rule. The 
Peebles arguments, and the Court of Appeals ruling, would allow Sam Peebles to 
have his cake and eat it too: not only does he obtain the benefits of a lease he 
never produced or entered into evidence, he is allowed to present evidence that 
contradicts the unambiguous express terms of the lease he relies upon. 
C. Brookside Entered Into Only one Lease per Space in the Park. 
In their brief the Peebles mix the facts presented to the trial court during the 
summary judgment phase and the trial phase, in addition to presenting disputed 
evidence regarding the actions of the previous owner of the Park as if Brookside 
was taking the actions, all in an attempt to confuse this Court as to what facts are 
at issue. The Peebles presented their arguments in similar fashion to the Court of 
Appeals which, in part, led to the incorrect ruling by the Court of Appeals that there 
was an issue of fact whether Brookside entered into more than one lease regarding 
the same spaces. Brookside at fflf22 and 25. 
To set the record straight, as referenced in the Peebles' brief, there was 
deposition testimony from Jan Shupe, one of the managers of the Park for the 
previous owner, that the previous owner executed more than one lease for the 
same space. (Brief of Appellees at page 28; R. 332; R. 592.) However, such 
testimony was not presented at trial. Mrs. Shupe's husband did not testify in his 
deposition or at trial that multiple leases were executed for the same space. (R. 
585-89; T. 332.) Furthermore, the previous owner of the Park, Richard Chipman, 
testified at trial that he would not enter into two leases for the same space as it 
would be a bad policy6 and that the Shupes did not have authority to enter into more 
®Q. What was the practice of Brookside Associates with respect to 
allowing for two leases of the same space? 
A. Two leases of the same space? 
Q. Yes. Let me ask this question. Maybe it's a hypothetical. If we have 
a lease of space 100 for Richard Rowley from Brookside Associates, 
would Brookside Associates also have had a lease for space 100 to 
Sam Peebles? 
A. Not that I would know, no. That would be highly unusual. 
Q. Why wouldn't you have a lease of the same space to two separate 
parties? 
A. There's only one person occupying that particular space, one family or 
one owner. 
Q. Would that present a problem for Brookside Associates if they both 
claimed entitlement to the same space? 
A. It would be a conflict of interest, that's for sure. 
(T. 83-84.) 
than one lease for the same space.7 (T. 83-85.) Furthermore, the leases utilized 
by Mr. Chipman did not allow subleasing of the spaces of the Park. (T. 86.) 
There was absolutely no evidence ever presented that Brookside itself 
entered into more than one lease for the same space. Ms. Shupe's deposition 
testimony, which was not in evidence at trial, was regarding the acts of the previous 
owner of the Park and not Brookside. Brookside's retention of the Shupes as 
managers after the purchase of the Park was nominal as the purchase occurred in 
December of 1994 and Mr. Shupe testified that they were managers only through 
1994. (T. 325, T. 36.) Furthermore, even if the Shupes entered into more than one 
lease per space, it does not void the legal impact of surrender which prevents a 
landlord from conveying an interest in real property which is incompatible with a 
pre-existing interest as argued in Section II of Brookside's initial brief before this 
Court. 
D. Absence of Sam Peebles' Lease in Evidence Suggests Lease did 
not Survive Physically or Legally Pursuant to the Intent of the 
Parties. 
The Peebles have never entered into evidence any lease Sam Peebles had 
with any owner of the Park. During trial, Richard Chipman, the former owner of the 
Park, testified that he and his mangers "did not destroy any papers" prior to 
7Q. Okay. Would they have-would the Shupes as managers have had 
authority, would they have had authority to enter into two leases to two 
separate parties for the same space? 
A. Not from us they wouldn't have. 
Q. That would have been beyond their scope of responsibilities? 
A. That is correct. 
(T. 85.) 
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Brookside purchasing the Park yet no Sam Peebles lease has been entered into 
evidence. (T. 80; T. 84) Copies of Sam Peebles' leases with the previous owner 
of the Park did not survive physically. The destruction and/or disposal of these 
documents by the prior owner suggests that it was the intent of the parties that such 
leases were deemed to have been revoked and no longer valid and of no legal 
effect. 
E. The Jury Verdict Regarding Surrender Does not bar 
Reinstatement of Summary Judgment. 
In their brief the Peebles argue that Sam Peebles's Affidavit does not conflict 
with his prior sworn statement and that such argument was validated by the jury 
verdict that Sam Peebles' had not surrendered his lease. (Brief of Appellees at 
page 24.) The jury verdict regarding Sam Peebles' surrender of his lease is 
irrelevant because Brookside's appeal concerns the trial court's granting of the 
Peebles Motion for Reconsideration overturning its previous grant of summary 
judgment to Brookside. The issue of whether Sam Peebles surrendered his lease 
is a mixed fact and legal question in which this court must determine whether the 
"given set of facts come within the reach of a given rule of law." State v. Pena. 869 
P.2d 932, 936-37 (Utah 1994). In reviewing the summary judgment portion of this 
action, this court may "determine the legal effect of specific facts." \± at 937. "In 
the abstract, the effect of a given set of facts is a question of law and, therefore, one 
on which an appellate court owes no deference to a trial court's determination." ]g\ 
at 936. 
Furthermore, the bona fide purchaser rule is a distinct legal theory from the 
doctrine of surrender that mandates a ruling in favor of Brookside during both the 
summary judgment and trial phase of this action. Application of the bona fide 
purchaser rule is consistent with the jury verdict that Brookside did not assume Sam 
Peebles' lease with the previous owner. (R. 920.) Even if neither the surrender nor 
the bona fide purchaser rule apply to Sam Peebles, Harold Peebles never had any 
lease with Brookside, or any previous owner of the Park. He therefore does not 
qualify as a resident under the Mobile Home Park Residency Act and is liable to 
Brookside for unlawful detainer. 
III. UTAH'S UNLAWFUL DETAINER STATUTE APPLIES TO BROOKSIDE'S 
EVICTION ACTION AGAINST THE PEEBLES RATHER THAN THE 
MOBILE HOME PARK RESIDENCY ACT. 
A. The Mobile Home Park Residency Act Does not Apply to 
Brookside's Eviction Action. 
In their brief the Peebles argue that the cases Lampasona v. Jacobs. 553 
A.2d 175 (Wisconsin 1989), Andreas v. Dynarski. 1986 WL 296403 (Conn. Super. 
Ct), and Benkoski v. Flood. 599 N.W.2d 885 (Ct. App. Wis. 1999) are persuasive 
in determining that the Peebles are residents under the Utah Mobile Home Park 
Residency Act (the "Act"). (Brief of Appellees at pages 32-34.) However, upon 
review, these cases all support Brookside's position in this matter that the Peebles 
are required to enter into a written lease with Brookside to qualify as residents 
under the Act and enjoy the benefits granted residents under the Act. 
It is uncontested that neither Sam nor Harold Peebles ever entered into a 
written lease agreement with Brookside as required by Section 57-16-4(2) of the 
Act. In fact, when Brookside requested that Sam Peebles execute a written lease 
for space #100 with Brookside, he refused. (R. 484; T. 184.) As owners of a 
mobile home located on a lot of the Park, the Peebles were liable to pay rent to 
Brookside under Section 57-16-9 of the Act as lienholders. 
In Lampasona. a Connecticut court ruled, interpreting a statute dissimilar to 
Utah's, that the park owner did not meet her "affirmative duty" to allow the 
defendant who purchased a mobile home located in the park to apply for residency 
and "therefore acquiesced to the defendant's residency in the park." Lampasona 
at 180 . The Utah Mobile Home Park Residency Act specifically mandates the 
opposite holding of Lampasona stating, "[t]he mobile home park may 
unconditionally refuse to approve any purchaser of a mobile home who does not 
register prior to purchase." Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-4(4). 
In this matter, Brookside requested Sam Peebles to enter into a written lease 
regarding space #100 which he refused. (R. 484; T. 184.) Sam Peebles 
specifically chose to not enter into a written lease as required by the Act therefore 
denying him resident status under the Act. Furthermore, the Connecticut statute 
in question grants a much broader class of people mobile home park residency 
protection stating "'[r]esident' means a person who owns, or rents and occupies, a 
mobile manufactured home in a mobile manufactured home park." Wis. Stat. § 21-
64(5). The Utah Mobile Home Park Residency Act limits the definition of a resident 
to "an individual who leases or rents space in a mobile home park." Utah Code 
Ann. § 57-16-3(3). The Act further requires that "[e]ach agreement for the lease of 
mobile home space shall be written and signed." Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-4(2). It 
is uncontested that neither Sam nor Harold Peebles entered into a written lease 
agreement with Brookside. 
In Andreas and Benkoski. it was undisputed that the mobile home owners 
had entered into written leases with the park owners and the courts resolved that 
the respective Connecticut and Wisconsin statutes did not require that such owners 
also occupy the mobile homes to be deemed residents and obtain the benefits 
under the respective mobile home park statutes. Andreas at 1; Benkoski at 887. 
In order for the Peebles to receive the benefits granted residents under the 
Mobile Home Park Residency Act they must meet the definitions of the Act. Sam 
Peebles refused to sign a written lease with Brookside, as required by the Act. (R. 
484; T. 184.) Harold Peebles never entered into a lease with Brookside or any 
other owner of the Park. The Peebles never offered into evidence any written lease 
with any owner of the Park. Because the Peebles do not meet the definition of 
"residents" under the Act they are not entitled to the benefits provided residents 
under the Act. 
B. Utah's Unlawful Detainer Statute Applies to Brookside's Eviction 
Action. 
In their brief the Peebles argue that they were not tenants at will under the 
Unlawful Detainer Act and cite Harry's Village. Inc. v. Egg Harbor Township. 446 
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A.2d 862, 865 (N.J. 1982) and Thomas J. Peck & Sons. Inc. v. Lee Rock Prods.. 
Inc.. 515 P.2d 446, 449 (Utah 1973) to support such an argument. (Brief of 
Appellees at page 35.) 
An important fact that distinguishes both Harry's Village and Thomas is that 
the tenants in question were current in paying their rent. In the case at hand, the 
Peebles were in default when the notice to quit was served. Given that Peebles 
tendered rent after it was past due "consent should not be implied from the payment 
of rent when it was made at the end of the holdover period, and then only after 
demand for payment had been made as part of the notice to quit." Bledsoe v. 
United States of Am. et al. 349 F.2d 605,607 (10th Cir. 1965). Furthermore, Sam 
Peebles refused to enter into a written lease with Brookside when Brookside 
requested. (R. 484; T. 184.) This shows there was no consent or meeting of the 
minds regarding a tenancy for term or compliance with the terms of the Mobile 
Home Park Residency Act 
"If nothing more is shown than payment and receipt of rent, the result at 
common law is the creation either of a tenancy at will or at most of one from year 
to year." Evershed v. Berry. 20 Utah 2d 203,436 P.2d 438,440 (1968). A tenant 
cannot refuse to enter into a lease and tender rent after the term of possession and 
claim that he has created a tenancy for term. Such a tenancy is at will. 
Furthermore, any rent Sam Peebles tendered to Brookside was as a lienholder of 
the mobile home which is liable for payment of rent under Section 57-16-9 of the 
Mobile Home Park Residency Act as opposed to a resident of the Park. Such 
statutory liability does not create a tenancy for term but rather a tenancy at will. 
C. Brookside's Eviction Action is not Moot. 
In their brief the Peebles argue that Brookside's claim of unlawful detainer is 
moot because the Peebles vacated space #100 and paid Brookside all unpaid rent 
while this action was pending. (Brief of Appellees at page 51.) However, the 
Peebles paid the rent to Brookside under a stipulation made in open court on 
December 4, 1996, that "Brookside Mobile Home Park will negotiate the checks 
tendered by Mr. Peebles for monthly rent without prejudice to the rights of the 
parties." (Letter from Brookside's counsel to Peebles' counsel dated December 4, 
1996 a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". Also 
attached hereto as Exhibits "B" and "C" are true and correct copies of letters dated 
January 8,1997, and May 29,1997, further confirming the stipulation.) Pursuant 
to the terms of the stipulation, Brookside cannot be prejudiced in this action by the 
Peebles' payment of rent. 
Even if the stipulation had not been entered into, payment of back rent after 
the commencement of an unlawful detainer and vacation are not sufficient to render 
a cause of action for unlawful detainer moot. Unlawful detainer commences upon 
service of notice of the same. Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-3. The property owner 
recovers damages for its lack of access to the property during the unlawful detainer 
period which is then trebled. Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10. Contrary to the 
arguments of the Peebles, "rent" is not the recovery provided by unlawful detainer. 
The plaintiff in an unlawful detainer action "is entitled to recover such damages as 
are the natural and proximate consequences of the unlawful detainer." Forrester v. 
Cook. 292 P. 206,214,77 Utah 137 (1930). "While damages may not be restricted 
to the rental value and may include more, yet the rental value during the unlawful 
withholding of possession is the minimum of damages." IsL "After the tenancy has 
been terminated by the notice required by the statute, the person in unlawful 
possession is not owing rent under the contract, but must respond in damages 
pursuant to the law." Id 
The Peebles tender of rent is not satisfaction of unlawful detainer, their 
continued possession of space #100 is the basis of the action. To allow a party to 
vacate premises days before a trial regarding unlawful detainer and render the 
matter moot, as happened in this case, would defeat the purposes of unlawful 
detainer. The payment of back rent should be applied against the judgment 
amount due Brookside after calculation and trebling of Brookside's damages 
pursuant to Utah statute. 
D. The Peebles Have no Safe Harbor Under the Mobile Home Park 
Residency Act. 
The Peebles cite Section 57-16-8 of the Mobile Home Park Residency Act 
as creating a safe harbor from imposition of treble damages for unlawful detainer. 
(Brief of Appellees at page 52.) Section 57-16-8 of the Act does not refer to 
unlawful detainer and is therefore limited to evictions brought under the Mobile 
Home Park Residency Act. Also, the Peebles refused to sign a written lease, as 
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required by the Mobile Home Park Residency Act, and therefore should be denied 
the benefits of the Act. (R. 484; T. 184.) 
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY UPHELD THE JURY VERDICT 
THAT BROOKSIDE'S REJECTION OF MS. SOUTHWORTH WAS 
REASONABLE. 
In their brief the Peebles argue that the Court of Appeals decision upholding 
the jury verdict that Brookside's rejection of Ms. Southworth's application was 
reasonable under the Mobile Home Park Residency Act was in error and should be 
overturned by this Court. (Brief of Appellees at page 37.) In reviewing such a 
challenge, this Court reviews the sufficiency of all evidence "in the light most 
favorable to the verdict." Child v. Gonda. 972 P.2d 425,433 (Utah 1999) (citations 
omitted). "So long as some evidence and reasonable inferences support the jury's 
findings," the appellate court will not disturb them. icL The verdict will only be 
reversed if "the evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so 
slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust." 
A. The Peebles Have Failed to Marshal the Evidence Regarding the 
Jury Verdict and the Findings Below Must Therefore be Affirmed. 
In order to allow this Court to conduct a meaningful and expedient review of 
the evidence, the challenging party "must marshal all the evidence in support of the 
findings." Robb v. Anderton. 863 P.2d 1322, 1328 (Ut. Ct App. 1993). In 
marshaling the evidence, the challenging party "must present, in comprehensive 
and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial." Moon 
v. Moon. 973 P.2d 431,437 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). If the challenging party fails to 
properly marshal the evidence, the appellate court must affirm the findings below. 
Robb at 1328. The Peebles in this matter failed to marshal the evidence before the 
Court of Appeals supporting the jury verdict. (Brief of Appellees before the Court 
of Appeals at pages 39-46.) Instead, they merely reargued the same case made 
before the trial court presenting selected facts and excerpts of trial testimony in 
support of their position. The Peebles cited only two pages of the trial transcript 
regarding evidence supporting the jury's verdict and then do not present such 
testimony verbatim, as they do with testimony supporting their position, but 
summarize it in a way to give the impression such testimony supports their 
arguments. (Brief of Appellees before the Court of Appeals at page 43.) 
The Court of Appeals did not rule on this issue, instead it held, that there was 
conflicting evidence regarding Southworth's application and "the jury was free to 
disbelieve "Southworth" and to believe Brookside's witnesses to the contrary." 
Brookside at [^38. 
In their brief before this Court the Peebles have acknowledged the evidence 
that supported the jury verdict that Brookside noted in its brief before the Court of 
Appeals. (Brief of Appellees at page 42.) Such acknowledgment is woefully 
inadequate in meeting the marshaling requirements of presenting the court a 
"general catalogue of evidence," correlating "particular items of evidence with the 
challenged findings," and convincing this Court of the trial "court's missteps in 
on 
application of the evidence to its findings." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 
P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
More evidence not noted in the Peebles' briefs before this Court or the Court 
of Appeals supporting the jury verdict includes the following evidence and the 
evidence noted in Sections IV.C and IV.D below. 
The testimony of Clair Lynn Patrick, Ms. Southworth's real estate agent and 
former mother in law, supports the jury verdict. She testified regarding the three 
occasions that she spoke with Jim Prentice: 
Q. In any of those occasions did he tell you that irregardless of her credit, 
the mobile home would have to be moved out of the park? 
A. No, not during those three occasions. 
(T. 320.) 
Additional evidence supporting the jury verdict is that Ms. Southworth's 
credibility as a witness was highly impeached due to her testimony that Brookside's 
employee Jim Prentice yelled at her.8 It is physically impossible for Jim Prentice to 
yell because his voice box and a portion of his tongue have been removed due to 
throat cancer. (T. 616-17.) He speaks with the aid of an electronic voice box 
without significant changes in volume. (T. 617-18.) In fact, the trial judge was 
8Q. Did you know then before you made this offer that Brookside was 
trying to have the home removed from the park? 
A. No, I did not. Nobody at the office, Jim, informed me of anything. 
Q. Well, he did tell you it was in litigation, you said that? 
A. Yelling at me, yes. 
(T. 304.) 
o n 
concerned whether the jury and the court report could hear Jim Prentice's testimony 
and arranged to have a court clerk repeat his responses during his initial testimony 
and later had counsel repeat his responses. (T. 98-103; T. 617.) Given that the 
jury had first-hand experience that Jim Prentice is unable to yell, it is a reasonable 
conclusion that the jury did not find any of Ms. Southworth's testimony credible. 
To aid this Court, following is evidence Brookside noted in a cursory review 
of the record that was not even mentioned in the Peebles' Brief before the Court of 
Appeals. In the testimony of Ms. Southworth, she acknowledged that her credit 
report from Western Reporting states that Western Reporting was unable to verify 
her employment though the employment was at a company she owned. (T. 306-
07.)9 
9ln so doing, Ms. Southworth testified as follows: 
Q. And if you look down at the employment section on page two of that, 
see the employment there? It says that you're employed at Utah 
Academy? 
A. Professional Dental Assistance, yes, I am. 
Q. It doesn't say that, does it? It just says employed Utah Academy. 
A. That's what the Western is, or Western Reporting put down, as far as 
the income. 
Q. You've answered my question. 
A. Sorry. 
Q. Let me ask you the next question. 
A. Yes. 
Q. There's also a comment there that says unable to verify. Do you see 
that? Do you see that? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. Did you ever get a call from Western Reporting seeking to verify how 
you were employed or whether it was self employment? 
A. No, I did not, not that I received myself. One of my staff members may 
have. 
(T. 306-07.) 
Q- i -
Ms. Southworth also acknowledged that her credit report from Western 
Reporting indicated that Western Reporting was unable to verify her account at 
Utah First Credit. (T. 307-308.)10 
In addition, though Ms. Southworth claims to have approached Mr. Prentice 
with her tax returns and financial information regarding her application to Brookside, 
Mr. Prentice testified that he did not see that she had tax returns or other financial 
information with her when Ms. Southworth came to the Brookside office. (T. 616.) 
The Peebles did not tender Ms. Southworth's tax returns into evidence to rebut 
Brookside's basis for denying her application and so the issue has not been 
preserved on appeal. Estate of Morrison. 933 P.2d 1015 (Utah App. 1997). 
Because the Peebles have failed to properly marshal the evidence before 
both this Court and the Court of Appeals, the jury's findings should be affirmed. 
10
 In so doing, Ms. Southworth testified as follows: 
Q. Okay. Look up at the language above that where it says bank 
summary. 
A. Financial? 
Q. Un-huh. Bank — well, just above it says bank summary? 
A. Okay. 
Q. You see that whole box right there? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It says bank, Utah First Credit, you see that language? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And it says later, down, comment: Would not verify information over 
phone. Do you see that? 
A. Right. 
Q. Did anyone ever tell you that the credit bureau was unable to verify 
information at Utah First Credit? 
A. I would not allow any of my banks, or personal to verify anything to 
anyone without okay from me. 
(T. 307-08.) 
Furthermore, the evidence noted above of Ms. Southworth's credit report indicating 
that the credit agency was unable to verify her employment or bank account is 
sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict that Brookside's rejection of her 
application as a tenant to be reasonable. The Peebles did not tender Ms. 
Southworth's tax returns into evidence and have therefore not preserved on appeal 
the issues of whether her credit was sufficient. 
B. The Peebles Have Failed to Preserve Arguments Regarding the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act and per se Violation of the Mobile Home 
Park Residency Act Raising Such Arguments for the First Time in 
Their Brief Before This Court. 
In their Brief the Peebles for the first time argue that Brookside's behavior in 
rejecting Ms. Southworth's tenant application was in violation of the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act and that Jim Prentice's "refusal" to meet with Southworth is a per se 
violation of the Mobile Home Park Residency Act. (Brief of Appellees at pages 41, 
n. 10; and pages 37-44.) "When there is no indication in the record on appeal that 
the trial court reached or ruled on an issue, this court will not undertake to consider 
the issue on appeal." Estate of Morrison. 933 P.2d 1015,1018 (Utah App. 1997). 
The Peebles failed to raise these issues at the summary judgment, trial, or initial 
appellate phase of these proceedings and therefore have not preserved these 
issues and they cannot be heard at this time. Even if this Court considers these 
issues, they are not a basis for overturning the jury verdict regarding Southworth's 
application. 
1. Brookside did not Violate the Fair Credit Reporting Act. 
The Peebles argue that "Brookside did not provide Ms. Southworth the right 
to dispute the 'accuracy and completeness' of the information contained in the 
Western Credit report, as required by the FCRA." (Brief of Appellees at page 42 
n. 10.) However, the FCRA does not place a duty on Brookside to allow a 
consumer to dispute a credit report. The FCRA requires Brookside to disclose the 
identity of the credit reporting agency so that the consumer can obtain a copy of the 
credit report and, if the consumer disputes material contained therein, the 
consumer can contact the credit reporting agency to modify the disputed 
information. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681. Ms. Southworth knew the identity of the credit 
reporting agency because she contacted Western Credit to send a report to 
Brookside. (T. 297-98.) Furthermore, Ms. Southworth did not claim that any 
information in the credit report was inaccurate. (T. 306-08.) There was therefor no 
violation of the FCRA by Brookside. Even if Brookside had violated the FCRA, such 
a claim would belong to Ms. Southworth and would not be actionable by the 
Peebles. 
2. Brookside did not Violate the Mobile Home Park Residency Act 
per se. 
The Peebles argue that Jim Prentice refused to meet with Ms. Southworth 
and such action was "per se" violation of the Mobile Home Park Residency Act. 
(Brief of Appellees at 37-44.) However, the plain language makes it clear that the 
standard for Brookside's actions under the Act is one of overall reasonableness 
without any one specific act or omission creating a "per se" violation. 
The only language of the Act referring to applications by potential mobile 
home buyers states "[t]he mobile home park, may however, reserve the right to 
approve the prospective purchaser of a mobile home who intends to become a 
resident, but the approval may not be unreasonably withheld." Utah Code Ann. § 
57-16-4(4). Pursuant to the plain language of the statute, Brookside is held to a 
"reasonableness" standard in its rejection of Ms. Southworth as a resident of the 
Park. 
Furthermore, Brookside did not refuse to allow Ms. Southworth to apply to be 
a resident of the Park. As Ms. Southworth testified, she commenced the application 
process by obtaining a credit report. (T. 296-97.) Brookside then rejected her 
application based on her financial inadequacies as documented in her credit report. 
(T. 618.) Based on the disputed evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, the 
jury found Brookside's actions reasonable and should not be disturbed on appeal. 
C. The Mobile Home of the Peebles was in an Unacceptable 
Condition. 
Though not at issue on appeal, the Peebles list in their brief numerous times 
the repairs allegedly made to the Peebles' mobile home plus allegedly 
contemplated repairs. (Brief of Appellees at pages 81J26; 9 n. 3; 10 ^ [30; and 43.) 
The only apparent reason for the Peebles to raise this issue is to generate 
sympathy with this Court by falsely representing the record below that the Peebles 
maintained their mobile home in good repair. However, the record is replete with 
evidence of the poor and hazardous condition of the Peebles' mobile home. This 
case highlights the difficult position of park owners in maintaining acceptable 
conditions for their tenants while dealing with those owning vacant and deteriorating 
mobile homes in a fair manner. As noted in Section IV.D below, Brookside took 
every effort to amicably resolve this dispute in a manner fair to both it and the 
Peebles. 
The Peebles' mobile home was in poor repair in March of 1997 as indicated 
by William A. Bailey an inspector for the City of West Jordan who inspected it in 
response to a complaint. (R. 436; T. 211.) Mr. Bailey noted that the stairs to the 
main entry were not up to code, the guardrail around the deck did not meet code, 
the stairs needed a hand rail, the rear steps required a landing and the rise and run 
did not meet code, the two halves of the mobile home were separating because the 
foundation was settling, and oil and solvent which had been left at the front of the 
mobile home needed to be properly disposed. (R. 418, T. 211-17.) Four residents 
of the Park also testified of the two halves of the mobile home separating, the 
overgrown and unkempt nature of space #100, children and teenagers playing in 
and around the abandoned mobile home, and that they believed the Peebles' 
mobile home to be a health and safety hazard. (T. 222-23; 225-26; 229-30; 232-
36.) None of the Peebles' claimed or contemplated repairs address these code 
violations. (Brief of Appellees at page 9 n. 3; T. 309-10.) 
The Peebles did not offer into evidence any receipts documenting repairs 
made. The Peebles did not offer into evidence any photos documenting that they 
had made the claimed repairs, instead relying on photos taken by Brookside to 
document the poor condition of the mobile home. The four neighbors to space 
#100 testified that they never saw anyone making repairs to the Peebles' mobile 
home. (T. 224-25; 229; 235.) The four neighbors all made complaints 
independently to Brookside regarding the unsafe condition of the Peebles' mobile 
home. (T. 224; 226; 230; 235-36.)11 The unacceptable condition of the Peebles' 
mobile home is additional evidence supporting the jury's verdict that Brookside's 
rejection of Ms. Southworth's application was reasonable.12 
D. Brookside Extended Every Effort to Amicably Resolve its Dispute 
With the Peebles. 
Brookside extended every effort to amicably resolve its dispute with the 
Peebles. Brookside's principle, Alan Glover, spoke personally with Sam Peebles 
11A sample of this testimony is as follows: 
Q. All right. Did you-you say you let management know. On how many 
occasions did you have discussions with management on it? 
A. A dozen times. 
Q. And did management indicate what they were trying to do? 
A. I'm not sure what they were doing, I just felt like they were dragging 
their feet, and I don't mean to criticize anybody, but that set for a long 
time and it was just an eyesore and a hangout. 
(T. 235-36.) 
12Brookside had the ability to compel the Peebles to remove their mobile 
home if was in a state of disrepair at the time of sale. Pursuant to Section 57-16-
4(7) of the Utah Code Annotated, an owner of a mobile home park "may require 
that a mobile home be removed from the park upon sale i f . . . the mobile home is 
in rundown condition or in disrepair." 
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while litigation was pending in an attempt to resolve the dispute amicably.13 In fact, 
even Sam Peebles testified that his telephone conversation with Mr. Glover was 
amicable.14 This is additional evidence supporting the jury's verdict that Brookside's 
rejection of Ms. Southworth's application was reasonable. 
13A. In essence, Mr. Peebles had had some economic difficulty in selling 
the house, and I guess he was concerned obviously that he wanted to 
get out from under the debt load and service of some investment. I 
assured him that we should be able to work together, there shouldn't 
be a problem, just get the home repaired or start on the restoration of 
it. I gave him no time line as to specifically when it had to be 
completed, just start working on it and get going and get it on the road 
to recovery. 
Q. What was his response? 
A. At that time I believe that we left on good terms and that he was going 
to continue to try to do something to upgrade it. 
(T. 52.) 
14A. I put the money into it to sell it right where it was. 
Q. What did he say when you told him that? 
A. That would be fine, that he would work with me. 
Q. Okay. Did he tell you anything else that you can recall? 
A. Basically it was a good conversation. 
(T. 418-49.) 
O O 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Brookside respectfully requests that this Court 
reinstate the summary judgment of the trial court, determine Brookside has 
prevailed on its cause of action against the Peebles for unlawful detainer, remand 
this matter to the trial court for calculation of appropriate treble damages under the 
applicable statute, and award Brookside Attorneys' fees and costs due under both 
the Unlawful Detainer Act and the Mobile Home Park Residency Act. 
DATED this M_ day of October, 2001. 
'Arm** 
NIS K. POOLE 
POOLE, SULLIVAN & ADAMS, L.C. 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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RUSSELL A. CLINE 
CRIPPEN & Cline L.C. 
10 West 100 South #425 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES 
Af\ 
Tab A 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
DENNIS K. POOLE, P.C. 
ANDREA NUFFEB GODFREY 
December 4, 1996 
4543 SOUTH 700 EAST. SUITE 200 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84107 
TELEPHONE (801) 263-3344 
TELECOPIER (801) 263-1010 
Mr. Russell A. Cline 
CRIPPEN & CLINE 
310 South Main, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Re: Sam Peebles 
Dear Mr. Cline: 
This letter will confirm the stipulation made in Court this 
date that Brookside Mobile Home Park will negotiate the checks 
tendered by Mr. Peebles for monthly rent without prejudice to the 
rights of the parties. 
I am enclosing herewith for your reference copies of the 
checks which we have been holding and which we are forwarding to 
Brookside to deposit. You should be aware that as of December 1, 
199 6 a total of $2,115.00 is due and owing for rent. After 
applying the checks we are holding, which total $1,370.00, there is 
a balance of $745.00. Unless we receive this amount in full within 
the next ten (10) days, we will file a Motion for Summary Judgment 
based upon the failure to pay the lot rental. 
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. 
;xuly yours, 
-&&U-
DENNIS K. POOLE 
DKP:ec 
Enc. 
cc: Brookside Mobile Home Park, w/checks 
elln*3.LTl 
TabB 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
DENNIS K. POOLE, P.C. 4543 SOUTH 700 EAST, SUITE 200 
ANDREA NUFFER SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84107 
TELEPHONE (801) 263-3344 
TELECOPIER (801) 263-1010 
January 8, 1997 
VIA TELEFAX - 322-1054 
AND REGULAR MAIL 
R u s s e l l A. C l i n e , Esq. 
C r i p p e n & C l i n e , L.C. 
310 South Main S t r e e t , S u i t e 1200 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84101 
Re: Brooks ide Mobi le Home Park 
Vs: Sam P e e b l e s , e t a l 
Dear Mr. C l i n e : 
We have been advised by our client that Mr. Peebles has left 
in their office a check in the amount of $1,000.00 to cover the 
past due rent as well as the monthly rental payment for January 
1997. This letter will confirm that we are advising our client to 
negotiate this check and any future payments made by Mr. Peebles 
pending the outcome of this litigation, should we choose to accept 
them, based upon the stipulation made in Court on December 4, 1996, 
to the effect that Brookside Mobile Home Park will negotiate the 
checks tendered by Mr. Peebles for monthly rent without prejudice 
to the rights of the parties. 
I am enclosing herewith for your reference a copy of the 
check. We will advise our client to hold the check until January 
13, 1997, before depositing the same in the event you are not 
agreeable to this procedure. 
Should you have any questions or objections regarding 
acceptance of this check, please advise before January 13th. 
truly youfsT 
DENNIS K. POOLE 
DKP:ec 
Enc. 
cc: Brookside Mobile Home Park 
TabC 
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
DENNIS K. POOLE, P.C. 4543 SOUTH 700 EAST, SUITE 200 
ANDREA NUFFER SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84107 
TELEPHONE (801) 263-3344 
TELECOPIER (801) 263-1010 
May 29, 1997 
VIA TELEFAX - 322-1054 
Russell A. Cline, Esq. 
Crippen & Cline, L.C. 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Re: Brookside Mobile Home Park 
Vs: Sam Peebles, et al 
Dear Mr, Cline: 
We have been advised by our client that Mr. Peebles has left 
a message on the answering machine in their office requesting the 
amount owing for rental payments now due inasmuch as he is desirous 
of bringing the payments current. Will you please advise Mr. 
Peebles that the following amounts are now due: 
March 1997 $ 265.00 
April 1997 $ 285.00 
May 1997 $ 285.00 
June 1997 $ 255.00 
Total $ 1,090.00 
The payments for March, April and May include a $30.00 late charge. 
If the payment is made after June 5th, there will be an additional 
late charge due on the June payment. 
This letter will confirm that any payments made by Mr. Peebles 
pending the outcome of this litigation, are based upon the stipula-
tion made in Court on December 4, 1996, to the effect that Brook-
side Mobile Home Park will negotiate the checks tendered by Mr. 
Peebles for monthly rent without prejudice to the rights of the 
parties. 
Should you have any questions, please advise. 
truly ipurs 
DENNIS K. POOLE 
DKP:ec 
Enc. 
cc: Brookside Mobile Home Park 
